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Preferences over Equality  
in the Presence of Costly Income Sorting†
By Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin*
We analyze preferences over redistribution in societies with costly ( positive) sorting according to income. We identify a new motiva-
tion for redistribution, where individuals support taxation in order to 
reduce the incentives to sort. We characterize a simple condition over 
income distributions which implies that even relatively rich voters—
with income above the mean—will prefer full equality (and thus no 
sorting) to societies with costly sorting. We show that the condition 
is satisfied for relatively equal income distributions. We also relate 
the condition to several statistical properties which are satisfied by a 
large family of distribution functions. (JEL D31, D63, H23)
The presence of income sorting or stratification in society has received plenty of attention in the economics and sociology literature.1 Relocating to a leafy sub-
urb, sending your child to a private school, or engaging in conspicuous consumption 
of a sports car, jewelry, or designer clothes, have all been mentioned as ways in 
which people try to guarantee that they mix, interact, or match with those with the 
same or higher income than theirs.2
When individuals participate in such costly sorting, what are their preferences 
over redistribution? Beyond being a traditional tool for creating equality, income 
redistribution will potentially decrease the incentive to sort as it might decrease the 
benefit of mixing with other rich individuals. In this paper we explore how costly 
income sorting shapes individual and political preferences over redistribution.
To analyze this question, we introduce a simple model in which individuals differ 
in their income. We assume that the utility of an individual exhibits complementari-
ties in his disposable income and that of those he interacts with. We consider incen-
tive compatible partitions of society into “clubs,” where all individuals in the same 
1 See for example Bénabou (1996), Fernández and Rogerson (2001), Kremer (1997), and Wilson (1987). 
2 The literature on conspicuous consumption includes contributions by Liebenstein (1950), Bagwell and 
Bernheim (1996), Pesendorfer (1995), and Heffetz (2011). Glazer and Konrad (1996) consider signaling of wealth 
via charitable donation, which exhibits positive externalities. Moav and Neeman (2012) analyze the trade-off 
between conspicuous consumption and human capital as signals for unobserved income. 
* Levy: Department of Economics, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK (e-mail: g.levy1@lse.
ac.uk); Razin: Department of Economics, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK (e-mail: r.razin@lse.
ac.uk).
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130031 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
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club pay the same costly signal and interact only with each other. This framework 
can be seen as a reduced form of several economic environments:
Example 1: The education market: The literature on sorting in children’s educa-
tion (see, for example, Epple and Romano 1998 and Fernández and Rogerson 2003) 
typically assumes a single crossing condition, i.e., that richer individuals care more 
about the education of their child. If there are peer effects, i.e., complementarities 
in the ability of pupils, or if education is financed locally with school quality deter-
mined by a majority vote in the community, then agents will sort into schools or 
neighborhoods according to income. Our model can be viewed as a reduced form 
of these models.3 The costly signals can then be entry fees to private schools or 
land and house prices in a wealthy suburb (where children would attend the state 
school);4 in both cases these costs imply that the child mixes with children of rela-
tively rich individuals.
Example 2: The marriage market: Another example explored in the literature is 
that of the marriage market. Pesendorfer (1995) describes a “dating” market where 
individuals of different types, be it their education, entertainment skills, or human 
capital, are matched with one another. The utility from matching is supermodular, 
which induces high types to distinguish themselves by acquiring the newest fashion 
design. As typically human capital and education attainment are correlated with 
income, our model is a reduced form for this matching environment as well; the 
different signals would be the different fashion labels that would allow individuals 
to identify one another.
In environments such as the ones described above, would individuals prefer to 
live in an equal society—which will reduce the incentive to sort—or in an unequal 
society where one can mix with the rich but has to pay a cost for doing so? We focus 
on the income distribution as the main parameter determining such preferences. One 
intuition would be that income distributions characterized by high income inequal-
ity might push the middle classes to advocate more redistribution as it will soften the 
pressures to engage in costly signaling. On the other hand, another intuition is that 
it might induce the middle classes to be more concerned about the incomes of the 
wealthier groups they wish to mingle with, and therefore not support redistribution.5
In our main result we show that it is the latter intuition which holds. In particular, 
we identify a necessary and sufficient condition (Condition 1) over income distribu-
tions which implies that all individuals up to the mean (and possibly some above) 
prefer full equality to any incentive compatible partition of society and any linear 
tax level. We show that Condition 1 is satisfied for relatively equal societies. If a 
society is sufficiently unequal on the other hand, the condition will be violated and 
3 Within this literature several papers also consider the effect of redistributive policies. Fernández and Rogerson 
(2003) consider provision of quality of schooling and analyze different equalizing policies which target the finance 
of education. Epple and Romano (1998) model the supply side, i.e., the market for private schools, and show how 
more wealthy and able agents are screened into better quality schools. 
4 See Bradford and Kelejian (1973) who show empirically that the decision of the middle classes to live in the 
suburbs depend (negatively) on the share of the poor in the city. 
5 Naturally, for individuals with income below the mean, there is also the standard motivation to support redis-
tribution to simply increase their own income. 
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there will be incentive compatible partitions of society for which some individuals 
below the mean would oppose redistribution. High income inequality implies that 
the middle class can, by sorting, avoid a large mass of very poor individuals, while 
keeping the cost of sorting relatively low.6 In other words, the cost and benefits of 
sorting generate endogenous preferences over the income distribution; in distribu-
tions with high income inequality, individuals will be against redistribution, while 
sufficient income equality will imply that individuals will prefer to live in a fully 
equal society.
We show that familiar distribution functions satisfy Condition 1. For example, 
sufficiently equal Pareto and log-normal distributions satisfy Condition 1. Moreover, 
Condition 1 is satisfied by all functions which are new better than used in expecta-
tions (NBUE),7 where NBUE is satisfied by functions with increasing hazard rate 
(and thus all log-concave density functions). Such functions for example are the 
uniform, exponential, normal, and sufficiently equal Gamma and Weibull functions.
We also consider the efficiency properties of sorting vis-à-vis full equality. We 
show that full redistribution is efficient (in a utilitarian sense) compared to any par-
tition into clubs if and only if the distribution function is NBUE. This implies that 
whenever full redistribution is efficient, it is also supported by a large coalition. 
However, it may be supported by such a coalition even if it is not efficient, i.e., when 
Condition 1 is satisfied but the income distribution is not NBUE. In particular, for 
many plausible income distributions like the Pareto and lognormal distributions, 
exclusive sorting is efficient but garners very little political support.
In the classical work of Meltzer and Richards (1981), an individual favors tax-
ation if (and only if) her income is below the mean income. While the empirical 
literature supports a positive relation between income and preferences over taxa-
tion, a puzzling observation is that many voters with income below the mean vote 
for parties on the right who traditionally oppose further taxation.8 The opposite 
happens as well; De La O and Rodden (2008) use the Eurobarometers and World 
Values Survey data to show that on average well over 40 percent of the wealthiest 
individuals in Europe vote for parties of the left. Moreover, some evidence also indi-
cates that voters in more equal societies are more positive towards further taxation 
and transfers, while voters in relatively unequal societies have less positive attitudes 
towards taxation.9
Our paper ties together these two empirical observations, as in the model it is 
in sufficiently equal (unequal) societies where one might find rich (poor) agents 
voting to the left (right). Our analysis contributes then to the political economy 
literature explaining one or both of the above empirical observations, by identifying 
6 Indeed India is one example of a society with a large fraction of the very poor, coupled with low income tax 
rates and a large degree of income sorting, as manifested for example in the marriage market. See Banerjee et al. 
(2013) who measure the effects of castes (often correlated with income) as well as costly signals (such as educa-
tion) on the marriage market. 
7 In reliability theory and specifically the analysis of life distributions (Barlow and Proschan 1966), NBUE 
describes the stochastic life span of a device, which is less reliable with time. 
8 See for example Frank (2004). Gelman et al. (2007) show that the positive relation between income and voting 
right is strong in poor American states and weak in rich states. 
9 See Perotti (1996) and Kerr (2013). 
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an  explanation that is based on the effects that redistribution has on the patterns of 
costly sorting in societies.10
Within this literature, the most related papers are by Bénabou (2000); Corneo 
(2002); and Corneo and Grüner (2002). In Corneo and Grüner (2002), individu-
als’ consumption levels signal their wealth, and therefore redistribution reduces the 
information value of signaling. Our analysis complements this paper by focusing on 
equilibria in the sorting market.
In a model where redistribution has potential efficiency gains, Bénabou (2000) 
identifies a U-shaped relation between income inequality and political support for 
redistribution. His paper highlights a strong relation between political support for 
redistribution and efficiency. In his model redistribution has value by providing 
insurance or a safeguard against credit constraints. When the income distribution is 
sufficiently equal, there is little conflict about redistribution per se and the efficiency 
gains make redistribution more politically successful.11 As in Bénabou (2000), 
in our model redistribution might have efficiency gains/costs in the form of its 
effect on the sorting market. Our paper complements Bénabou (2000), as in our 
model the gains/costs from sorting are distributed unevenly in the population, 
which implies that the connection between efficiency and support for redistribution 
is not as clear cut.
Corneo (2002) assumes that individuals care about their rank in society. In his 
model progressive taxation prevents the negative externalities that arise when agents 
bias their labor supply to increase their rank. These biases are strongest in an equal 
society and as a result a progressive tax is efficient when inequality is low.
Other papers explain the empirical observations on the misalignment of class 
and preferences for redistribution and how it is related to income inequality. Piketty 
(1995) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) show how different beliefs, i.e., whether 
success is a function of luck or effort, could induce multiple equilibria, one with a 
large welfare state and low effort and one with a small government and high effort.12 
Benabou and Ok (2001) show how a future redistribution of a concave (convex) 
function of the current income distribution will induce those below (above) the 
mean to vote against (in favor of) redistribution. Galor and Zeira (1993) show how 
credit constraints and education externalities imply that middle income voters prefer 
a more equal society, as this will allow the poor to gain higher education levels.13
Our model is also related to a recent literature on the cost of signaling. Hoppe, 
Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) consider a model in which individuals signal their attri-
butes. Their model is an incomplete information model with two-sided heterogene-
ity, finite types and perfect signaling, which implies that the condition they find for 
efficiency of signaling is stronger than ours.14 Several other papers focus on coarse 
10 For a good summary of this literature, see Alesina and Giuliano (2011). 
11 This explains the decreasing part of the U-shaped relation between income inequality and political support for 
redistribution. See also Corneo (2002) for a similar relation. 
12 See also Alesina and Angeletos (2005). 
13 Other related papers explain these phenomena by assuming that agents have preferences over a multidimen-
sional policy or identity space (Roemer 1998, Levy 2004, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, and Shayo 2009). 
14 Specifically, they show that signaling is more (less) efficient compared with random matching (which in our 
model, in utilitarian terms, is equivalent to full equality) if the distribution over types satisfies decreasing (increas-
ing) failure rate. 
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matching, for example Rege (2008); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Ozdenoren (2011); 
and McAfee (2002), and show the conditions under which coarse matching provides 
sufficiently high surplus compared with random or perfect matching.
Tournaments have been analyzed as another form of sorting; Fernández and Galí 
(1997) show that with credit constraints, markets perform less well than tourna-
ments at sorting individuals according to ability. Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) 
explore, in the context of a tournament, the effect of equality in the distribution of 
rewards vis-à-vis an equality in the distribution of income. They show that the latter 
induces effort whereas the former hampers it.
Our model can also shed light on recent empirical findings on inequality and 
happiness, which show that happiness can decrease even when everyone’s income 
had increased, if inequality increases as well.15 In the standard approach (e.g., 
Meltzer and Richards 1981) when utility is proportional to disposable income this 
cannot arise. One explanation that has been put forward in this literature is that 
agents have direct preferences over income inequality. In our model such prefer-
ences arise endogenously, and indeed, it is easy to find examples in our model in 
which the income of all individuals increases along with inequality, while the utility 
of a sizable fraction of the population decreases as a result of the changes in the 
cost and benefit of sorting. Consider for example a society with sufficient income 
equality, which initially has no sorting. As income increases for all, together with 
income inequality, sorting may then arise. The poorest individuals who will then 
be excluded, for example from private schools, will then be worse off (as long as 
income had not increased too much).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model. 
In Section II we derive our main result in a simple environment in which we com-
pare full redistribution to a society with at most two clubs and no taxation. We 
generalize these results to any incentive compatible partition and any linear tax in 
Section III, where we also discuss more general utility functions. In Section IV, we 
discuss the implications of our results to income distribution functions that have 
been used to fit the data. Section V concludes.
I. The Model
The population is composed of agents who differ in their income,  x, which is 
distributed according to some distribution  F(x) and density  f (x) , strictly positive on 
some  [0, ν],  0 < ν ≤ ∞. Let  μ (m) denote the mean (median) of the distribution, 
with  m ≤ μ. 
We assume that when an individual with disposable income  x interacts with an 
individual with disposable income  y , as in the marriage market, or belongs to a 
club in which the average income is  y , as in the case of peer or network effects in 
education, he receives a utility  x y . The assumption of supermodularity is important 
as it creates the incentive to (positively) sort. Our results could be adjusted to other 
supermodular functions as we discuss in Section III.
15 A recent example is Oishi, Kesebir, and Diener (2011). See also Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004). 
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We incorporate in this environment a set of costly signals (such as private schools 
with different fees) that will enable sorting. Thus, when some individuals use a 
costly signal they will interact randomly with, and only with, other individuals who 
use the same signal. When an agent with income  x i uses a signal that costs  b, his 
utility will therefore be
(1)  x i E[ x j | j ∈  X b ] − b ,
where  X b is the set of other agents who use the same signal. The quasilinear nature 
of the utility function is simple to use but is not necessary for our results; our main 
result can be extended to the case in which the utility of an agent with income  x i 
who mixes in the same “club” with the population whose average income is  x j is 
 ( x i − b)(E( x j ) − b) instead.16 Also, in some applications, the signal might provide 
an intrinsic utility on top of the sorting value, e.g., private schools might provide, 
aside from peer effects, better education. With some monotonicity condition, this 
can be accommodated in the model.
By single crossing, if some agent with  x i prefers to use a signal with cost  b > b′ , 
all agents with  x >  x i will prefer  b over  b′ . We will therefore focus on monotone 
sorting, i.e., with connected intervals. We will abstract away from the supply side, 
i.e., how the signals or their costs are being determined.17 But when agents choose 
optimally which signal to use, no matter how the supply side arises, the costs of the 
signals have to satisfy some incentive compatibility constraints:
DEFINITION 1: An incentive compatible partition is a vector  x = ( x 0 , 
x 1 , …  x n−1 ,  x n ) with  x 0 = 0 ,  x n = ν and  x i <  x i+1 , such that all agents with type 
x ∈ [ x i ,  x i+1 ) for  i = 0, 1, … , n − 1 pay  b i and interact with agents in  [ x i ,  x i+1 ) 
only,18 with  b 0 = 0 and
(2)  b i −  b i−1 =  x i (E[ x j |  x j ∈ [ x i ,  x i+1 ]] − E[ x j |  x j ∈ [ x i−1 ,  x i ]]) ≥ 0 .
In such an incentive compatible partition, the prices are such that for all  i, the 
agent in  x i is indifferent between joining the club below her and the club above 
her. By single crossing, all other agents act optimally by joining the club they are 
assigned to in the partition. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we are 
restricting the price of joining the lowest club in the partition to zero. Henceforth, 
when we say a partition or a sorting environment, we mean an incentive compatible 
partition. For expositional purposes, we will present in Section II all the main results 
for the case of sorting with at most two clubs, i.e., where the  incentive-compatibility 
partition is  x = (0,  x ˆ, ν). These results generalize to any incentive compatible par-
tition as we show in Section III.
Our key assumption is that what matters for the utility from matching is (at least 
to some degree) the absolute, disposable, income. This will imply that when income 
16 Specifically, Condition 1 in Proposition 1 would be a sufficient condition for this utility function. 
17 For such analysis see Damiano and Li (2007) and Rayo (2013). 
18 For completeness, when  i = n − 1, the last interval is closed from above as well, i.e.,  [ x n−1 ,  x n ]. 
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inequality is reduced, so are the incentives to sort or the willingness to pay for sort-
ing. In particular, with full redistribution, the income of all is the same, at  μ, and 
sorting cannot arise.19 Note that the utility from matching in such an equal society 
would be  μ 2 . 
Our main analysis focuses on deriving a simple condition such that if satisfied, all 
agents up to the mean (and possibly some above) prefer full redistribution (hence-
forth FR) to any incentive compatible partition with sorting. Thus, our approach is 
to find conditions that will apply to all partitions, rather than focusing on a particular 
one. This allows us to pursue results in environments in which there are typically 
multiple equilibria, or in environments in which we, the modelers, do not have a 
precise grasp of the supply side of the sorting market.20
While we abstract away from a specific political model, we will show that pref-
erences over FR are characterized by a cutoff and all voters with income up to that 
cutoff will support redistribution. The larger is the coalition supporting FR, the more 
likely the FR is to be politically implemented. Thus, the preferences we character-
ize—where a coalition of more than 50 percent of all agents up to at least the mean 
support FR—can be manifested as the political outcome of many political models. 
For example, it would arise in a two-candidate competition, any political model 
that supports the median voter results or some supermajority rules, as well as some 
environments which allow for lobbying or noise voters.21
II. Preferences over Redistribution
In this section, for expositional purposes, we focus on a comparison between 
a society with FR and a society with a simple incentive compatible partition of 
the form  x = (0,  x ˆ, ν) , where  x ˆ ∈ [0, ν] . In the next section we will general-
ize all the results below to any incentive compatible partition and also allow for 
linear taxes.
In Section IIA we will characterize a simple, necessary, and sufficient condition 
on the distribution function, which will imply that a coalition of all agents up to the 
mean (and some above) will support FR over any society with sorting. As the mean 
and those above him do not enjoy redistribution per se, this will allows us to identify 
a new motivation for redistribution which arises due to sorting only. We also show 
that this condition is more likely to be satisfied when  F(x) is more equal, and char-
acterize a set of income distributions that satisfies it. In Section IIB we will derive 
the conditions under which FR is efficient in a utilitarian sense compared with all 
sorting environments, and in Section IIC we discuss the relation between efficiency 
and political support.
Preliminaries.—Note that the utility from FR is  μ 2 for all agents ; the income of 
each agent will be  μ and thus the utility from a match is  μ 2 . We now construct the 
19 Formally, under full resdistribution, in any incentive compatible partition it has to be that  b i = 0 for all  i . 
20 A different approach is taken by Moav and Neeman (2012) who focus on a refinement of equilibria. 
21 Note that we do not consider the preferences of the firms or organizations that provide signals; to maintain the 
political model one can assume that they compose a negligible part of the population. 
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utility from  x = (0,  x ˆ, ν) or in short the cutoff  x ˆ. Suppose that all agents above 
x ˆ pay  b( x ˆ) and all below pay nothing. The type at the cutoff  x ˆ will be indifferent 
between paying the cost of sorting and gaining  x ˆE[ x j |  x j >  x ˆ], versus not paying 
and gaining a utility of  x ˆE[ x j |  x j <  x ˆ], where
(3)  E _  x ˆ ≡ E[x | x ≤  x ˆ] =  
 ∫ 
0
  x ˆ xf (x) dx
 ________
F( x ˆ) ,  
  _ E  x ˆ ≡ E[x | x ≥  x ˆ] =  
 ∫  x ˆ υ xf (x) dx ________
1 − F( x ˆ) . 
In an incentive compatible environment, the price of the signal must satisfy:
(4)  b( x ˆ) =  x ˆ( _ E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) .
The expected utility of an individual  x <  x ˆ is therefore  x E _ x ˆ and the expected util-
ity of an individual  x >  x ˆ can be written as  x _ E  x ˆ − b( x ˆ) = x _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ( _ E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) or:
(5)  (x −  x ˆ) _ E  x ˆ +  x ˆE _  x ˆ .
Expected utility from using the signal can be interpreted as the utility of the cutoff 
type, plus an information rent component that depends on the distance from the cut-
off. This utility is increasing and convex in the income  x ; the slope for  x <  x ˆ is  E _ x ˆ 
and the slope for  x >  x ˆ, is  _ E  x ˆ . This implies:
LEMMA 1: The utility from sorting with any  x ˆ is increasing and convex in  x; as the 
utility from Fr is equal to all, then whenever a voter with income  x′ prefers Fr, then 
all voters with  x < x′ do so as well.
Note that if  x ˆ = 0, then  b( x ˆ) = 0, which is equivalent to having no club at all 
so that the whole population matches randomly, each gaining a utility of  xμ . This 
implies that preferences over redistribution would be standard: all agents up to the 
mean would support redistribution, and all agents above the mean would be against 
it. However, when  x ˆ > 0, both the cost of the club and the benefit of the club 
increase. It is obvious that if  μ <  x ˆ then the mean and in fact all those with  x <  x ˆ, 
prefer FR to sorting, as then both their own and their match’s income would be 
higher. It is therefore left to consider clubs in which  μ >  x ˆ, which we now consider.
A. sorting versus Equality
Note that the mean prefers FR to any club  x ˆ < μ if and only if
(6)  (μ −  x ˆ) _ E  x ˆ +  x ˆE _  x ˆ ≤  μ 2 .
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Divide by  μ to get
(7)  (1 −   x ˆ __ μ)  _ E  x ˆ +   x ˆ __ μ  E _ x ˆ ≤ μ .
As
(8)  μ =  (1 − F( x ˆ)) _ E  x ˆ + F( x ˆ) E _ x ˆ ,  
then FR is preferred to coarse sorting for any cutoff  x ˆ if and only if:
(Condition 1)  x/μ ≥ F(x) for all x < μ .
Recall that when  x ˆ > μ, the mean trivially prefers FR. We then have:
PROPOSITION 1: The mean (and all below) prefers Fr to any cutoff  x ˆ if and only 
if  F(x) satisfies  x/μ ≥ F(x) for all  x < μ .
Note that when  x/μ > F( x ˆ) for some  x ˆ < μ , then the mean will strictly prefer 
FR to the environment with  x ˆ and by continuity some agents with  x > μ will do 
so as well. Thus, a coalition which is larger than all those up to the mean, including 
relatively rich agents, will support FR. On the other hand, when this condition fails, 
this implies that there exists a cutoff  x ˆ for which the mean and some individuals 
poorer than the mean prefer sorting to FR.
The condition is simple and intuitive, as it encodes the benefit and costs of belong-
ing to a club  [ x ˆ, ν) for the mean relative to FR. The left hand side,   x ˆ __ μ , measures the 
relative cost of joining the club. The information rent of the mean is proportional to 
(1 −  x ˆ/μ) ; specifically, a high  x ˆ/μ implies a low information rent. The right hand 
side,  F( x ˆ) , denotes the relative benefit of the club. A higher  F( x ˆ) implies a large frac-
tion of the poor is excluded from the club. Belonging to this club allows the mean 
to stay away from a large constituency of poor individuals (and thus match with a 
high probability with the higher incomes). Condition 1 goes over all the possible 
club configuration which include the mean, and demands that he prefers full redis-
tribution to these clubs.
To see this interplay between cost and benefits, consider first a value of  x ˆ, which 
is close to the mean. For a high  x ˆ/μ , the mean is almost indifferent between join-
ing the club or not as the information rent is minimal. In this case, all the rent is 
extracted from him and so the club is too costly. Indeed, when  x ˆ = μ we have 
 x ˆ/μ = 1 > F(μ) = F( x ˆ) and so the condition is satisfied in a neighborhood of 
x ˆ = μ . Thus, for a sufficiently high  x ˆ, there are no benefits that can convince the 
mean to prefer the club to FR.
On the other hand, when  x ˆ is small, the mean has a high information rent and 
therefore perceives the club as relatively less costly. This means that it might be 
hard to satisfy Condition 1. Specifically, if  F( x ˆ) is high for such a small  x ˆ, the ben-
efit of the club is also high as then there are many, very poor, individuals who are 
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excluded from the club. This arises when  F is sufficiently concave, as we discuss 
below. Condition 1 insures that this will not happen by keeping  x ˆ sufficiently larger 
than  F( x ˆ) . In other words, insuring that the benefit from sorting relative to its cost 
cannot be too high.
In Section V we generalize the analysis and show that Condition 1 is necessary 
and sufficient also when considering any incentive compatible partition, as well as 
such a partition with an interior (linear) tax and redistribution scheme. Generalizing 
Condition 1 to allow for some taxation under sorting is trivial. Generalizing it to any 
partition with more than one signal does not follow immediately however. In partic-
ular, whenever  x/F(x) is increasing, adding more signals below some cutoff  x ˆ < μ 
reduces the signaling cost for all types  x >  x ˆ and thus improves the utility from 
sorting. Still, we are able to show that Condition 1 is necessary and sufficient for all 
partitions; the intuition is that Condition 1 insures that the mean prefers FR both to 
a partition  [0,  x 1 , υ] and to a partition  [0,  x 2 , υ], for  μ >  x 2 >  x 1 , which together 
imply that the mean would also prefer it to a partition  [0,  x 1 ,  x 2 , υ]. 
We next discuss the relation of Condition 1 to inequality and then some familiar 
properties of distribution functions, which ensure that Condition 1 is satisfied.
condition 1 and inequality.—From the intuition above, we can see that 
Condition 1 can be violated when there is a large share of very poor agents (a large 
F(x) for a small  x), which is typically associated with a high level of inequality. 
A sufficiently concave function with a high  f (x) for small  x will therefore violate 
Condition 1. However, a more equal income distribution, with sufficiently low  f (x) 
for small  x , would render Condition 1 viable. To see this, consider Figure 1. The 
figure illustrates that when  F(x) is too concave, it will be above  x/μ for small levels 
of  x, whereas if this is not the case (specifically whenever  f (0) < 1/μ or in other 
words when  F(x) is not too concave ), then for all  x,  F(x) lies below  x/μ: 
The straight line coresponds to  x/μ. If  F(x) is sufficiently equal, then it is 
completely below  x/μ , whereas if it is too concave, or in other words there is a 
large share of the very poor, it is above  x/μ for small values of  x .
As another illustration, consider the almost fully equal distribution, with almost 
all weight on  μ. In that case, for any club, the benefit from being in the club is asso-
ciating with a type of average income close to  μ (as in FR) while the cost is strictly 
positive as it is in the order of, for a cutoff  x ˆ,  x ˆ(μ −  E _ x ˆ ) > 0. 
We now make this relation between Condition 1 and equality more precise. In 
particular, we show that whenever Condition 1 is satisfied by some  F(x), then it is 
also satisfied by  G(x), if  G belongs to a set of mean-preserving contractions of  F. 
We say that  G is a monotone mean-preserving contraction of  F if to obtain  G, 
for all values smaller than  μ, weight always shifts upwards to higher values, still 
below  μ (naturally some weight shifting must occur also above  μ to preserve the 
mean and the second-order stochastic dominance of  G, but we can be agnostic about 
their exact nature). Formally,  G has to be a mean-preserving contraction of  F sat-
isfying: (i)  F(μ) = G(μ), (ii) for any interval  y = [ y 1 ,  y 2 ] ⊂ [0, μ] for which 
 ∫ y 
  g(x) dx <  ∫ y 
  f (x) dx, then there exists an interval  y′ =  [ y 1 ′ ,  y 2 ′ ] ⊂ [0, μ] such 
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that  y 1 ′ ≥  y 1 and  y 2 ′ ≥  y 2 and  ∫  y  ′  
  (g(x) − f (x)) dx =  ∫ y 
  ( f (x) − g(x)) dx. 22 We 
then have:
PROPOSITION 2: 
 (i )  suppose that  F(x) satisfies condition 1. Then all  G(x) obtained from  F(x) by 
some monotone mean-preserving contraction also satisfy condition 1.23 
 (ii )  suppose that  F(x) does not satisfy condition 1. Then there exists a monotone 
mean-preserving contraction of  F(x) that would satisfy condition 1.
PROOF: 
 (i)  Note that  G(μ) = F(μ) and that  G(x) ≤ F(x) for any  x < μ by the defini-
tion of a monotone mean-preserving contraction . Thus,  G(x) ≤ F(x) ≤ x/μ 
and  G(x) satisfies Condition 1. 
 (ii)  One way to do so would be to shift (almost) all weight from  [0, ζμ] to  [ζμ, μ] 
(and a corresponding change above  μ), where  ζ = F(μ). Condition 1 is sat-
isfied then for all  x > ζμ (as then  x/μ > 1 > F(x)), as well as for  x < ζμ 
for which  F(x) → 0. ∎ 
Condition 1 is then more likely to be satisfied when  F(x) is more equal in the 
monotone mean-preserving contraction sense. Note that with more general utility 
functions, such as  h(x)g( y), a condition similar to Condition 1 can be constructed 
and a similar relation between the Condition and inequality can be derived, as in 
Proposition 2 (see Section III).
22 It is easy to find such a mean-preserving contraction. 
23 It is possible to construct nonmonotone mean preserving contractions (for example, with smaller weight on 
low and high values below the mean, and higher on intermediate values below the mean) in a way that would violate 
Condition 1. 
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condition 1 and statistical Properties of Distributions.—We now continue to 
explore Condition 1. Below we show that functions with the familiar property of 
increasing failure or hazard rate (IFR) satisfy the condition. In fact, Condition 1 will 
be satisfied with a strict inequality for any IFR distribution. Intuitively, these distri-
butions do not provide sufficient benefits from matching with the rich as the tail on 
high income falls too quickly.
However, we can also relate Condition 1 to a weaker property, called NBUE. 
In reliability theory, in the analysis of life distributions (see Barlow and Proschan 
1966), a distribution  F is said to be new better than used in expectations, in short 
NBUE, if it describes the stochastic life span of a device which is less reliable with 
time. Formally,
DEFINITION 2: A distribution function satisfies NBuE if and only if  
_
 E x − x ≤ μ 
for all  x. 
PROPOSITION 3: Any NBuE function satisfies condition 1.
PROOF: 
Assume that  
_
 E x − x ≤ μ for any  x. Using (8) we have that
(9)  μ = F(x) E _ x + (1 − F(x)) _ E x ≤ F(x) E _ x + (1 − F(x))(x + μ) 
 ⇔ F(x)μ ≤ F(x) E _ x + (1 − F(x))x ⇔ μ ≤  x ____ F(x) + ( E _ x − x) 
 ⇒ μ <  x ____ 
F(x) for any x > 0 as  E _ x < x. | | 
Note that NBUE is a weaker condition than Condition 1, and thus there will be 
functions satisfying Condition 1 which are not NBUE. It is easy to establish that a 
function with IFR, which implies that the survival rate  1 − F is log-concave, also 
satisfies NBUE. The proposition below (essentially a corollary to Proposition 3 
and results from the statistical literature) lists properties of distribution functions, 
which are stronger than NBUE, and hence functions with these properties satisfy 
Condition 1:
PROPOSITION 4:
 (i ) suppose that  f satisfies decreasing mean residual life, i.e.,  _ E  x ˆ [x] −  x ˆ
decreases in  x ˆ or in other words  ∫ x ∞ (1 − F(v)) dv is log-concave; it then 
satisfies condition 1.
 (ii ) suppose that  f has increasing failure rates or in other words that  1 − F is 
log-concave; it then satisfies condition 1.
 (iii ) suppose that  f is log-concave; it then satisfies condition 1.
PROOF: 
To see (i), note that  _ E  x ˆ [x] −  x ˆ = μ for  x ˆ = 0. Decreasing mean residual life (DMRL) implies then that  _ E  x ˆ [x] −  x ˆ < μ, and thus NBUE is satisfied, which by 
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Proposition 3 implies that Condition 1 is satisfied. It is then easy to see (ii) and (iii) 
(this is based on Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005 and Barlow and Proschan 1966): 
(ii) If  f has IFR then  1 − F is log-concave, which also implies that  ∫ x ∞ (1 − F(v)) dv 
is log-concave, which is identical to DMRL and thus by (i) it satisfies Condition 1. 
(iii) If  f is log-concave then also  1 − F is log-concave (and hence IFR), which then 
implies (ii) and thus Condition 1 is satisfied.  ∎ 
The following flow chart is a graphical illustration of Proposition 4:
(10)   f (x) is log-concave 
    ⇒ 1 − F(x) is log-concave 
    ⇔ F(x) has iFr ( f (x)/(1 − F(x)) increases) 
    ⇒  ∫ 
x
 ∞ (1 − F(v)) dv is log-concave 
    ⇔ F(x) has DMrL ( _ E x − x decreases in x) 
    ⇒ F(x) satisfies NBuE ( _ E x − x ≤ μ) .
Log-concavity, of either  f, its survival/reliability function  1 − F, or the integral of 
the reliability  ∫ x ∞ (1 − F(v)) dv, are all stronger properties than Condition 1 and are 
easy to verify. They are satisfied for example by the uniform, normal, logistic, and 
exponential functions, as well as for the Power, Weibull, Gamma, and Beta func-
tions with shape parameters greater than one. Intuitively, it implies that the density 
does not increase too fast and thus prevents  x/F(x) from being too low, or that the 
density on the tails is not too “heavy,” implying also a relatively equal distribution 
as discussed above.
B. sorting versus Equality: Efficiency
In our analysis so far, we have considered political support for FR compared with 
sorting. As we have shown, sorting generally entails benefits for the rich and losses 
for the poor, and we have analyzed when the positive distributional effects of sorting 
that accrue to the rich (compared with FR) will also spread to the mean (for whom 
FR has no other redistributional effects).
We now explore for which distribution functions it is efficient—in a utilitarian 
sense—for society to have FR compared with sorting. While sorting always entails 
benefits when the utility from a match is supermodular, it is also costly,24 which 
implies that in some environments it might be inefficient.
24 We perceive the costs of sorting to be either deadweight loss, or benefit only a negligible proportion of soci-
ety, which is the case in which the suppliers of the signals are highly concentrated. 
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For the next result, note that  F is new worse than used in expectations (NWUE) 
if and only if  μ +  x ˆ ≤  _ E  x ˆ for any  x ˆ. We then have:
PROPOSITION 5: Fr is more (less) efficient than any club  x ˆ if and only if  F is 
NBuE (NWuE).
PROOF: 
Average utility from sorting for some  x ˆ can be written as:
(11)   ∫ 
0
 ν  u x ( x ˆ) dF =  ∫ 0  x ˆ x E _  x ˆ f (x) dx +  ∫  x ˆ ν  ( x ˆE _  x ˆ + x _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆE _  x ˆ ) f (x) dx 
    = F( x ˆ) E _ x ˆ 2 + (1 − F( x ˆ)) x ˆE _  x ˆ − (1 − F( x ˆ)) x ˆ _ E  x ˆ + (1 − F( x ˆ)) _ E  x ˆ 2
  =  ( E _ x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ ) (F( x ˆ)( E _ x ˆ +  _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ) +  x ˆ) +  _ E  x ˆ 2 .
The average utility from FR is:
(12)  ∫ 
0
 ν u x (Fr) dF =  μ 2 
   = μ (F( x ˆ) E _ x ˆ + (1 − F( x ˆ)) _ E  x ˆ ) = μ (F( x ˆ)( E _ x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ ) +  _ E  x ˆ ) .
Let  Δ =  ∫ 0 ν  u x ( x ˆ) dF −  ∫ 0 ν  u x (Fr) dF. Then:
(13)  Δ = ( E _ x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ ) (F( x ˆ)( E _ x ˆ +  _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ) +  x ˆ) +  _ E  x ˆ 2 − μ (F( x ˆ)( E _ x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ ) +  _ E  x ˆ ) 
 = ( E _ x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ ) (F( x ˆ)( E _ x ˆ +  _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ − μ) +  x ˆ) +  _ E  x ˆ ( _ E  x ˆ − μ)
 = ( E _ x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ ) (F( x ˆ)( E _ x ˆ +  _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ − μ) +  x ˆ) +  _ E  x ˆ F( x ˆ)( _ E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ )
 = ( E _ x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ )(F( x ˆ)( E _ x ˆ −  x ˆ − μ) +  x ˆ)
 = ( E _ x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ )(1 − F( x ˆ))(μ +  x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ ) ,
and thus  Δ < 0  (Δ > 0) for any  x ˆ if and only if  μ +  x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ > 0  (μ +  x ˆ −  _ E  x ˆ < 0) for any  x ˆ which is the NBUE (NWUE) property.  ∎ 
To see the intuition for the efficiency result, note that positive assortative 
matching outweighs the cost when variability in the distribution is sufficiently 
high (in which cases random matching results in significant losses). Hall and 
Wellner (1981) showed that any NBUE function has a coefficient of variation 
 cV(x) =  √ _____ Var(x) /E(x) ≤ 1 , whereas for any NWUE,  cV(x) ≥ 1 . Thus, 
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under NBUE, the variability of the income distribution is too small and sorting is 
inefficient.25
C. Efficiency and Political outcomes
Note that by Lemma 1, the utility from signaling is strictly convex in the 
income  x. This implies that
(14)  u μ ( x ˆ) <  ∫ 0 ν u x ( x ˆ) dF. 
This is simply an implication of Jensen’s inequality given the convexity of the 
utility of signaling as a function of  x ; the LHS is the utility of the mean  μ from a 
club  x ˆ, and the RHS is the average utility in the population from a club  x ˆ. 
Thus, if FR is efficient, so that for any  x ˆ,
(15)  ∫ 
0
 ν u x ( x ˆ) dF <  ∫ 0 ν u x (Fr) dF,  
it implies that
(16)  u μ ( x ˆ) <  ∫ 0 ν u x (Fr) dF =  u μ (Fr),  
and all up to at least the mean will support FR. However, given the slackness in (15), 
it can also be the case that FR is not efficient (so that some sorting environment 
yields a higher average utility for society), while the mean and all below prefer FR:
COROLLARy 1: if  F(x) is such that Fr is more efficient relative to any club  x ˆ, then 
a coalition of all up to at least the mean will support Fr. However, for some  F(x) 
and  x ˆ, the mean and all below will support Fr even when the club  x ˆ is more efficient 
than Fr.
Our analysis in Propositions 1, 3, and 5 allows us to identify for which income 
distributions FR has political support even among relatively rich voters (as in (16)) 
and for which income distributions FR is efficient (as in (15)).
Moreover, we identify that the wedge between efficiency and political support 
would arise for all functions that do not satisfy NBUE but satisfy Condition 1. The 
set of such functions contains a subset of long-tailed distribution functions, such as 
the Pareto or the log-normal distributions. For these functions (for all parameters), 
for a sufficiently high  x ˆ, sorting of the form  {[0,  x ˆ), [ x ˆ, ∞)} is efficient compared 
25 For the case of perfect continuous signaling, Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) show that  cV(x) ≥ (≤)1 
is a sufficient and necessary condition for sorting to be efficient (not efficient) compared with random matching. For 
their discrete model which has incomplete information on a discrete set of types but perfect signaling, a necessary 
and sufficient condition for efficiency (inefficiency) of signaling is for the function to have decreasing (increasing) 
failure rate. 
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with FR. From a utilitarian point of view, it is better to separate the very rich 
from the rest. Intuitively, the costs of doing so are relatively low due to the small 
mass of the rich, while the benefits for the rich population are high due to the 
complementarities.
Formally, for distribution functions with a long tail, for a high enough  x ˆ, we have 
that  E  x ˆ −  x ˆ > μ . This holds even if the income distribution is very close to being 
equal. The more equal it is though, the higher  x ˆ has to be for sorting to be efficient. 
Moreover, when such income distributions are sufficiently equal, Condition 1 is 
satisfied: in the Pareto case it is satisfied when  α, the shape parameter, is sufficiently 
large and in the case of the log-normal when  σ, the shape parameter, is sufficiently 
small (see also Section IV).
Example: consider the Pareto distribution,  F(x) = 1 −  x m α/ x α , with  x m = 1. 
suppose for example that  α = 1.5 , which implies that  μ = α/(α − 1) = 3. in 
this case it is easy to verify that condition 1 is satisfied. However, all  x ˆ ∈ (1.5, 3) 
also satisfy  
_
 E  x ˆ −  x ˆ > μ. Thus, such clubs, which the mean belongs to, are efficient (compared with Fr) but do not have the political support of the mean and all those 
below. This would hold for all  α ∈ [1.5, 2] and respectively,  x ˆ ∈ (α, μ). For val-
ues of  α > 2 (associated with greater equality), condition 1 is still satisfied, with 
the club being efficient for all  x ˆ > α > μ. in this case the mean and all below 
strictly prefer Fr simply as they are excluded from the club.
The intuition behind this is that for such clubs to be efficient,  x ˆ has to be suffi-
ciently high (to push  E  x ˆ to be high enough using the long tail). But this implies that 
the information rent enjoyed by the mean is too small (or nonexistent). Therefore, 
although efficient from the point of view of aggregate welfare, the distributional 
effects of sorting imply that it will have little political support in some cases.
As a political outcome is typically deemed to be more successful when a larger 
coalition supports it, our next question is whether political behavior is locally aligned 
with efficiency. That is, if  x ˆ changes and as a result FR becomes more efficient rela-
tive to the club, is FR supported by a larger coalition? We can then show (the proof 
is in the Appendix):
PROPOSITION 6: 
 (i )  There exist F(x) for which an increase in  x ˆ(< μ) increases the efficiency of 
the club (relative to Fr) but decreases its political support (relative to Fr). 
 (ii )  if  _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ < (>)0 for  x ˆ → 0, then for a small enough  x ˆ, an increase in  x ˆ
decreases (increases) the efficiency of the club (relative to Fr) and decreases 
(increases) the size of the coalition supporting the club (relative to Fr) . 
The first part illustrates that efficiency and political support do not always go 
hand in hand. For example, for the Pareto distribution, there exist clubs to which the 
mean belongs to, where an increase in the exclusiveness of the club also increases 
the efficiency of the club. However, this implies that the information rent enjoyed 
by some of the members of the club is lowered (specifically those who are not too 
rich), which therefore decreases the political support of the club relative to FR. Our 
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proof in the Appendix makes use of environments in which the local NBUE property 
is not satisfied for  x ˆ < μ but Condition 1 is satisfied.
For a small enough  x ˆ, the localized requirement for NBUE and Condition 1 is 
the same. This turns out to be sufficient to show that an increase in the efficiency 
of the club goes hand in hand with an increase in its political support. To see why, 
note that at  x ˆ = 0, from a utilitarian point of view, the average utility from sorting 
(essentially random matching with a zero price), is the same as the utility from FR. 
But this is also true for the mean himself: the utility from  x ˆ = 0 and the utility from 
FR are equivalent. Finally note that the joint requirement is a local DMRL ( _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ
decreasing) which intuitively implies that the increase in the benefit from a club, 
manifested through  
_
 E  x ˆ , is too small relative to the increase in cost (in the order of  x ˆ). 
D. sorting versus Equality: The Preferences of Poorer Agents
We now look at smaller, majoritarian coalitions, which includes agents only up to 
the median. When we had considered the preferences of the mean, this had allowed 
us to identify the nonstandard incentives for redistribution, as from the point of 
view of their own income, those from the mean and up lose from redistribution. 
Moreover, it had allowed us to see when relatively rich voters support redistribution 
and when a large coalition can arise to support such policy.
Assuming that the median is poorer than the mean, as is typically the case, 
whenever the mean supports FR, so does the median. But for the median voter 
(or all below the mean), there are also income incentives for redistribution, which 
Condition 1 does not take into account. We now focus on the median voter to com-
bine sorting and standard income motivations for redistribution. We show that these 
additional income incentives imply that whenever the income distribution is suffi-
ciently unequal, the median (and all those below) would favor FR:
PROPOSITION 7: The median (and all below) prefer Fr to any partition if 
m < 0.5μ .
PROOF: 
Note that  m  
_
 E m is the highest utility the median can get in all clubs as  _ E m is 
the highest expected type he could match within a club he belongs to, and we are 
excluding the cost of the match. Note though that when  m < 0.5μ, we have that:
(17)  m  _ E m = m  
 ∫ 
m
 ∞ xf (x) dx
 _________
1 − F(m) = 2m  ∫ m ∞ xf (x) dx <  μ 2 
as  μ =  ∫ 0 ∞ xf (x) dx >  ∫ m ∞ xf (x) dx. ∎ 
The condition holds for sufficiently unequal distributions with half the population 
concentrated on relatively low incomes compared with the mean; the proposition 
adds then a counterpart to Condition 1. As sorting benefits arise through income 
complementarities, if the distribution is too unequal and the income of the median 
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is simply too low, no sorting benefits will allow the median to prefer sorting to FR. 
Moreover, if  m < 0.5μ is satisfied for some  F(x) , it will also be satisfied for any 
G(x) which is a monotone mean-preserving spread of  F, i.e., when weight is trans-
ferred from high values in  [0, μ] to low values in  [0, μ]. 26 Thus, the more unequal 
the distribution is in this second-order stochastic sense, the more likely is the con-
dition to hold. Together, Propositions 1 and 7 imply that from the point of view of 
the median, either relatively equal or relatively unequal distributions would yield 
preferences for FR (as Proposition 1 provides a sufficient condition for the median).
Remark 1: Note that for all distributions with decreasing failure rates (DFR), 
then  m ≤ μ ln 2 ≈ 0.69μ, and thus redistribution will be favored in a large family 
of DFR distributions by the median and those below (and in particular those that are 
relatively more concave or more unequal). This arises as all DFR’s with the same 
mean as some exponential, are more variable, i.e., stochastically dominated in a 
second-order sense, than the exponential one, which s atisfies  m = μ ln 2 .27 Thus, 
together with Proposition 4, both IFR functions and a large family of DFR functions 
will imply support for FR.
E. sorting: An “Ends against the Middle” coalition
We conclude this section with a very different political economy question. So far, 
we have considered government intervention only in the form of redistribution. This 
has led to monotone coalitions, characterized by a cutoff, where all voters below this 
cutoff advocate redistribution.
One other possible intervention for the government is to introduce taxes or sub-
sidies in the housing or education markets; these will not only generate revenues 
from sorting, but will also affect the price and composition of sorting. For example, 
a tax on luxury goods or private schools might increase the exclusiveness of sorting.
To shed some light on this, we ask whether agents will prefer their club to be 
more or less inclusive. In other words, conditional on sorting, what form would 
voters prefer it to be.
For the poor voters who are not in the club, the higher is  x ˆ the higher is the aver-
age income of those left to interact with them. For those in the club, the derivative 
of the utility from sorting (for some type  x) is:
(18)  ( _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ) ((x −  x ˆ)  f ( x ˆ) _______ 1 − F( x ˆ) − 1) + ( x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) ( x ˆ  f ( x ˆ) ____F( x ˆ) − 1) .
An increase in  x ˆ directly increases  
_
 E  x ˆ ,  E _  x ˆ , and the price. What is clear from (18) 
is that once some  x prefers an increase in  x ˆ, then all those above prefer an increase 
26 And similarly, weight shifts on values above  μ to maintain the mean and the second order stochastic domi-
nance of  F. 
27 Specifically, by Theorems 4.4 and 4.7 in Barlow and Proschan (1965),  F(x) ≥ 1 −  e  −x ___μ   for all  x < μ if 
F(x) is DFR, which implies that the median is lower in the DFR distribution. 
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in  x ˆ as well. This reveals a possible “ends against the middle” coalition for small 
local changes.
PROPOSITION 8: A coalition to increase  x ˆ will always consist of agents below  x ˆ
and sometimes consists of all agents from some  x >  x ˆ and above.
Moreover, it is also easy to find parameters for income distributions for which an 
“ends against the middle” majority coalition can arise to successfully increase the 
exclusiveness of the club.
III. Generalizing the Results
In this section we generalize our results. First we show that Condition 1 is suf-
ficient for a coalition of all agents up to the mean to prefer FR compared with any 
incentive compatible partition, and any linear tax. We then generalize our efficiency 
results and finally we provide some results on general utility functions.
A. General incentive compatibility Partitions and Linear Taxes
We first extend Proposition 1 to any incentive compatible partition 
 x = ( x 0 ,  x 1 , …  x n−1 ,  x n ) and to any linear tax  t > 0 , i.e., when the disposable 
income of an agent of type  x is  x t = (1 − t)x + tμ. We can then show:
PROPOSITION 9: 
 (i )  The mean and all below prefer Fr to any incentive compatible partition  x 
and any  t ∈ [0, 1] if and only if  F(x) satisfies condition 1. 
 (ii )  When  t is sufficiently large, the mean and all below prefer Fr to any incentive 
compatible partition  x .28
Note that when a tax  t > 0 is in place, then the relevant income distribution 
becomes  F t (x) = F ( x − tμ ____1 − t ) , with  F 0 (x) = F(x). In the proof we show that for 
any  t, the mean prefers FR to any incentive compatible partition  x if and only if 
 F t (x) satisfies Condition 1. Note also that  F t (x) is essentially a monotone 
 mean-preserving contraction of  F, 29 and thus if  F satisfies Condition 1, so does 
 F t (x). Thus, the necessary condition for  t = 0 is also sufficient for any  t > 0, 
implying that the mean prefers FR to any partition and any  t if and only if  F(x) sat-
isfies Condition 1. Moreover, when  t is sufficiently high, Condition 1 is satisfied by 
F t , as then income equality is high enough. Similarly, Condition 1 is necessary for 
a partition with one cutoff and turns out to be sufficient for any other partition with 
more than one cutoff.
28 The proof is in the Appendix. 
29 In our main model we have considered only densities with full support while  F  t is not full support, but this is 
not important for the gist of our analysis. 
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Next we turn to generalizing Proposition 5, which contrasts the efficiency of sort-
ing and FR. We have a similar generalization to the above, and in particular, when  t 
is high enough, FR is always efficient:
PROPOSITION 10: 
 (i )  Fr is more efficient than any incentive compatible partition and any 
t ∈ [0, 1] if and only if  F is NBuE, whereas for any t, it is less efficient than 
any incentive compatible partition if and only if  F t is NWuE. 
 (ii )  When  t is large enough, Fr is more efficient than any incentive compatible 
partition.
PROOF: 
Define
(19)  _ E i t ≡ E[ x j t |  x j ≥  x i ] = (1 − t) _ E i + tμ. 
Note that
(20)  μ +  x i t −  _ E i t > 0 ⇔  _ E i <  μ ____ 1 − t +  x i ,
and so if  F is NBUE, then also  F t is NBUE for any  t > 0 . In the Appendix we show 
that  Δ = u(x) − u(Fr) can be written as:
(21)  Δ =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
 ( E i−1 t −  E i t) (1 − F( x i )) (μ +  x i t −  _ E i t) .
Given the above, NBUE (NWUE) of  F t is therefore necessary and sufficient for FR 
to be efficient (inefficient) compared with any partition, given some  t . However, as 
μ +  x i t −  _ E i t > 0 ⇔  _ E i <  μ ____ 1 − t +  x i , if  F is NBUE then it also holds for  F t and 
in other words FR is more efficient ( Δ < 0) than any partition and any  t ∈ [0, 1] 
if and only if  F is NBUE. Note that for a high enough  t,  μ +  x i t −  _ E i t > 0 for all  x i t, 
implying that high enough equality is associated with the efficiency of FR compared 
with any partition and the (high enough) tax rate. ∎
B. More General utility Functions
We now generalize our results to a larger set of utility functions. Let  Φ(x, y) be 
the benefit of an individual with income  x from membership in a club composed of 
other individuals with average income  y. We assume that  Φ 1 ,  Φ 2 > 0 and for assor-
tative matching that  Φ 12 > 0. 
In what follows we restrict attention to simple partitions with the cutoff  x ˆ. As we 
do above, we are interested in a condition under which the individual with average 
income prefers FR to sorting for any  x ˆ (we focus on the interesting case in which 
x ˆ < μ, as otherwise  Φ(μ,  E _ x ˆ ) < Φ(μ, μ)) . We therefore need:
(22)  Φ(μ,  _ E  x ˆ ) − Φ( x ˆ,  _ E  x ˆ ) + Φ( x ˆ,  E _ x ˆ ) < Φ(μ, μ) for all  x ˆ < μ ,
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which is satisfied if:
(Condition 2)  Φ(μ,  _ E  x ˆ ) − Φ(μ, μ) < Φ( x ˆ,  _ E  x ˆ ) − Φ( x ˆ,  E _ x ˆ ) for all  x ˆ < μ .
We first illustrate that also in this level of generality there is a sense in which 
more equality implies that Condition 2 is easier to satisfy. Consider an income 
distribution  F(·). For any  α ∈ (0, 1) define  F α as the income distribution with 
 F α (x) = (1 − α)F(x) + α  δ μ (x), where  δ μ (x) is the degenerate distribution that 
has all mass on  η, i.e.,  δ μ (x) = 0 if  x < μ and equals 1 otherwise. The property 
of supermodularity,  Φ 12 > 0, and  Φ 2 > 0 will then be sufficient to guarantee that:
LEMMA 2: if  F satisfies condition 2 then for any  α ∈ (0, 1) ,  F α satisfies condi-
tion 2.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: 
Let  E _  x ˆ G and  
_
 E  x ˆ G denote the relevant expressions  E _  x ˆ and  _ E  x ˆ under distribution  G. 
Note that for any  x ˆ < μ,  E _  x ˆ  F α  =  E _ x ˆ F as the density, conditional on  [0,  x ˆ] is the same 
under both distributions. Note further that the expectation of  F α is  μ. Finally note 
that  
_
 E  x ˆ  F α  ≤  _ E  x ˆ F as all we did is convexify the conditional distribution with one 
that has a lower expectation. By  Φ 12 > 0 and  Φ 2 > 0 and for any  x ˆ, the LHS of 
Condition 2 has decreased more than the RHS.  ∎ 
We now further explore Condition 2. In particular we want to analyze its relation 
to Condition 1. In the next two results, we show that a sufficient degree of concav-
ity and a relatively weak supermodularity, imply that Condition 1 is sufficient for 
Condition 2:30
LEMMA 3: suppose that  Φ 22 (x, y) ≤ 0 and that  Φ 2 (x, y)/ Φ 12 (x, y) ≥ x for all 
 x and  y. Then condition 1 implies condition 2.
Example 1: Suppose that  Φ(x, y) =  (x y + 1) β , in this case,
(23)   Φ 2 (x, y) _______ Φ 12 (x, y) =  
x(x y + 1)  ________________ (x y + 1) + y(β − 1)x ≥ x ⇔ β ≤ 1; and 
  Φ 22 (x, y) ≤ 0 ⇔ β ≤ 1 .
As a further illustration of the sufficiency of Condition 1 when  Φ satisfies some 
concavity, let us consider a more specific form of complementarities, namely that,
(24)  Φ(x, y) = h(x)g( y) + f (x) + l( y). 
30 The proof of Lemma 3 is in the Appendix. 
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Note that to guarantee incentive to sort,  h ′ > 0 and  g ′ > 0 implying that 
Condition 2 becomes,
(25)  Φ(μ,  _ E  x ˆ ) − Φ(μ, μ) < Φ( x ˆ,  _ E  x ˆ ) − Φ( x ˆ,  E _ x ˆ ) ⇔  h( x ˆ) ____h(μ) >  
g( _ E  x ˆ ) − g(μ)  ___________
g(  E  x ˆ ) − g( E _ x ˆ ) , 
where by the mean value theorem, this is equivalent to:
(26)  h( x ˆ) ____
h(μ) > F( x ˆ) (  g ′ (  y ′ ∈ (μ,  
_
 E  x ˆ ))  _____________ g ′ ( y ″ ∈ ( E _ x ˆ ,   E  x ˆ )) ) .
LEMMA 4: suppose that  h(0) = 0 . (i ) if  h and  g are concave then condition 1 
implies condition 2. (ii ) if  h and  g are convex then condition 2 implies condition 1.
PROOF: 
If  g is concave (convex), then   g ′ ( y ′ ∈ (μ,  
_
 E x ))  __________ g ″ ( y ′ ∈ ( E x ,  _ E x )) < (>)1. If  h is concave (convex),  h(x) ___
h(μ) > (<)  x _y. ∎ 
Example 2: Assume that  Φ(x, y) =  x α  y β . (i) Whenever  α, β ≤ 1 , Condition 1 
implies Condition 2, and thus when Condition 1 is satisfied, the mean and all below 
prefer FR to any partition with one club. (ii) Whenever  α, β ≥ 1, Condition 2 
implies Condition 1. Therefore, in this case, the set of distributions for which the 
mean and all below prefer FR to any partition with one club shrinks.
IV. Discussion: Some Empirically Estimated Income Distributions
Our analysis had identified a simple necessary and sufficient condition for at least 
a majoritarian coalition to prefer FR. We now discuss whether this condition is sat-
isfied for income distributions, which are often used in the literature.
For the United States in the 1960s, Salem and Mount (1974) have advocated a 
version of the Gamma distribution that is IFR, i.e., with a shape parameter estimated 
to be around two.31 For these distributions the higher the shape parameter, the lower 
the Gini coefficient is, and hence Condition 1 is satisfied for the sufficiently equal 
Gamma and Weibull distributions.
Other distributions that are typically considered in the literature are Pareto (which 
is DFR, i.e., decreasing failure rates), and the lognormal (which is first IFR and then 
DFR). Singh and Maddala (1976) claim that income distributions should be DFR 
31 The distribution is  f (x) =   λ α  ____ 
A(α)  x α−1  e −λx on  [0, ∞] for  A(α) =  ∫ 0 
∞  e −u  u α−1 du. For this distribution the 
median is  3α − 1 _____
3λ ,  1 __  √ __ α is the parameter of skewness, and the mean is  α __λ . For the decades of the 60s, their estimate 
of  α is around 2 and  λ is around  3 ___  10 4 . 
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at least for high enough income, as the ability to make more money should increase 
with one’s income, once some threshold is reached.32
It is easy to compute Condition 1 for Pareto distributions on  [1, ∞) and to see 
that it is satisfied for all such distribution with a sufficiently high shape parameter  α, 
α ≥ 1.5 . The higher the shape parameter  α, the lower the Gini coefficient is (which 
equals  1/(2α − 1)), and thus we find that Condition 1 is satisfied for the more equal 
Pareto distributions.33 For lower shape parameters,  α ∈ (1, 2] , when the Gini coef-
ficient is high, the Pareto distribution satisfies  m < 0.5μ, and thus the condition 
identified in Proposition 7 is satisfied for the more unequal Pareto distributions.
The lognormal distribution is characterized by two parameters,  μ ̃ (log-scale) and 
σ (the shape). The Gini coefficient is  2Φ(σ/ √ __ 2) − 1 where  Φ(x) is the standard 
normal distribution, and thus a lower  σ is associated with a lower Gini. In this fam-
ily of distributions we can show that Condition 1 is satisfied as long as  σ is suffi-
ciently low,  σ ≤ 1.1, and irrespective of  μ ̃ ,34 whereas the condition specified in 
Proposition 7 holds for all, more unequal, lognormal functions with  σ sufficiently 
high , σ > 1.174 . If one assumes in addition that  μ ̃ > 0 (as in typical income dis-
tributions), then the condition in Proposition 7 holds also for all  σ ∈ [1.1, 1.1774]. 
V. Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the implications of positive assortative (and 
costly) sorting on preferences for redistribution. We have identified a simple condi-
tion on income distributions, which is necessary and sufficient for all agents up to 
the mean to prefer full equality compared with any sorting environment. We have 
illustrated that this condition is associated with income equality, and that a large 
degree of income inequality implies that the middle classes prefer to match with 
the rich, even when it’s costly, rather than live in an equal society. From a dynamic 
perspective, this indicates that both extreme environments may be stable. That is, 
once the distribution is sufficiently equal, agents will rather push for more equality, 
and when the distribution is sufficiently unequal, sorting will be stable and might 
breed more inequality.
Another avenue for future research is to consider government policies that 
combine redistribution with taxes or subsidies over the cost of signaling. We have 
identified that preferences over the exclusiveness of the club, as opposed to prefer-
ences over redistribution, do not satisfy single-crossing. Analysis that incorporates 
 policies that both affect individuals’ income via redistribution and the exclusiveness 
of sorting via such taxes is therefore promising and nontrivial.
32 Singh and Maddala (1976) fit the data to some mixture of Pareto and Weibull, with an increasing proportional 
hazard rate  ( x  f (x) _______ 1 − F(x)) , which then converges to become constant. We note that Cramer (1978) advocates cau-
tion with respect to interpreting failure rates properties with regard to static distributions of income (where such 
properties should relate to time or age). 
33 Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) and Diamond and Saez (2011) provide evidence that the top tail of income 
distributions follows a Pareto distribution. See also Cowell (2011). 
34 One example for the estimation of  σ is the estimation of the distribution of earnings of United Kingdom full 
time male manual workers (see Cowell 2011) with an estimated  σ 2 = 0.13 well below the cutoff above. See also 
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-martin (2009). 
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Mathematical Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 
Recall that the average utility from sorting minus that from FR,  Δ, is:
(27)  Δ =  ∫ 
0
 ν  u x ( x ˆ) dF −  ∫ 0 ν  u x (Fr) dF
 = − ( _ E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) ( x ˆ + μ −  _ E  x ˆ ) ,
and thus
(28)  dΔ = − (d _ E  x ˆ − d E _  x ˆ ) ( x ˆ + μ −  _ E  x ˆ ) −  ( _ E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) (1 − d _ E  x ˆ ) .
Now consider the voter who is indifferent between FR and some club  x ˆ, some 
 z( x ˆ) > μ. The voter  z( x ˆ) satisfies:
(29)  z( x ˆ) _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ( _ E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) =  μ 2 
     z( x ˆ) =   μ 
2 +  x ˆ( _ E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) _____________  E  x ˆ   
    dz( x ˆ) ____
d x ˆ
 =   ( ( 
_
 E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) +  x ˆ(d _ E  x ˆ − d E _  x ˆ ) ) _ E  x ˆ − d _ E  x ˆ ( μ 2 +  x ˆ( _ E  x ˆ −  E _ x ˆ ) )   __________________________________________ _ E  x ˆ 2 .
Note that  d 
_
 E  x ˆ = ( _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ)  f ( x ˆ) ______ 1 − F( x ˆ) ,  d E _  x ˆ =  
f (x) ___
F(x) (x −  E _ x ˆ ). 
For (i), consider the example of the Pareto distribution with  x m = 1, α = 2 
and  x ˆ = 1.5. Note that  x ˆ < μ = 3. We find that  dΔ > 0 and  dz( x ˆ) ___
d x ˆ
 > 0. This 
implies that the club becomes more efficient relative to FR but also that the support 
of FR increases. On the other hand when  α = 8 and  x ˆ = 1.1 < μ ≈ 1.14, we 
have that both  dΔ < 0 and  dz( x ˆ) ___
d x ˆ
 < 0. It is then the case that greater efficiency of 
FR results in lower political support for it.
For (ii), note that as  x ˆ → 0,  dΔ converges to  −μ(1 − d _ E  x ˆ ). Moreover,  dz( x ˆ) ___d x ˆ con-
verges to  μ 2 (1 − d _ E  x ˆ ). Thus, if  d _ E  x ˆ < 1 when  x ˆ → 0, we have that  dΔ < 0 
and  
dz( x ˆ) ___
d x ˆ
 > 0, which implies that a higher  x ˆ implies both a greater efficiency of 
FR and a greater political support of FR. If  d 
_
 E  x ˆ > 1 when  x ˆ → 0 , then a higher 
x ˆ implies a greater efficiency of the club and lower support of FR. Finally note 
that  
d( _ E  x ˆ −  x ˆ) ______
d x ˆ
 = d _ E  x ˆ − 1 and thus the relevant property is the local MRL for 
x ˆ → 0. ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9: 
As we deal with general partitions, define
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(30)  E i ≡ E [ x j |  x j ∈ [ x i ,  x i+1 ]] ,
and analogously
(31)  E i t ≡ E [ x j t |  x j ∈ [ x i−1 ,  x i ]] = (1 − t) E i + tμ. 
(i) We provide a direct proof for all partitions and  t . We have already considered the 
case of one signal or a partition with  n = 2. Note that if we start from some posi-
tive level of taxation  t, the condition becomes   x t  __μ ≥ F(x) for all  x < μ, for which 
Condition 1 is sufficient. The necessary part of the proposition follows then from 
this case for  t = 0 .
We now show sufficiency using an induction on the number of elements in the 
partition. Suppose that the proposition is true for any partition with  j = k − 1. 
Consider all partitions with  j = k. 
Note that if  μ <  x 1 , then the utility of the mean is like in a partition with  j = 2 
and the same  x 1 , and so Condition 1 applies. If  x 1 < μ <  x 2 , consider his utility 
from a partition with  j = 3 and the same  x 1 ,  x 2 , which is the same again. Thus, if 
x i−3 < μ <  x i−2 for  i ≤ k, his utility from the partition is the same as the util-
ity from a partition with  j = i and the same  x 0 ,  x 1 , … ,  x i−2 , which by the induc-
tion hypothesis proves the result. Now assume that  x k−2 < μ <  x k−1 . The mean’s 
expected utility can be written as:
(32)  x 1 t  E 0 t + ( x 2 −  x 1 )(1 − t) E 1 t + ⋯ + ( x k−2 −  x k−3 )(1 − t) E k−3 t  
    + (μ −  x k−2 )(1 − t) E k−2 t ) ,
which is strictly lower than the utility from a partition with  j = k − 1 and the same 
x 0 ,  x 1 , … ,  x k−2 in which case the last expectations are replaced by  _ E  x k−2  and the 
rest is the same.
Finally consider the case of  μ >  x k−1 . We first divide both sides by  μ and then 
use Condition 1 repetitively:
(33)   x 1 t __μ  E 0 t +   x 2 
t −  x 1 t ______μ  E 1 t + ⋯ +   x k−1 
t −  x k−2 t   _________μ  E k−2 t +  (1 −   x k−1 t  ___μ )  E k−1 t 
   =   x 1 t __μ ( E 0 t −  E 1 t) + ⋯ +   x k−1 
t  ___μ ( E k−2 t −  E k−1 t ) +  E k−1 t 
   ≤ F( x 1 )( E 0 t −  E 1 t) + ⋯ + F( x k−1 )( E k−2 t −  E k−1 t ) +  E k−1 t 
   = F( x 1 ) E 0 t +  (F( x 2 ) − F( x 1 )) E 1 t + ⋯ (F( x k−1 ) − F( x k−2 )) E k−2 t 
 +  (1 − F( x k−1 )) E k−1 t = μ ,
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where the inequalities follow from Condition 1 as the difference in the expectations 
terms is negative.
(ii) As we illustrate in the proof above, fixing  t, the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for FR to be preferred by the mean to any partition is Condition 1 (t) which 
states that   x t  __μ ≥ μ for any  x < μ, for which Condition 1 is sufficient. But for a high 
enough  t, Condition 1  (t) would hold for any  F(x) (as it becomes sufficiently equal). 
For example, for all  t > F(μ),   x t  __μ ≥  F(μ)μ ____μ > F(x) for any  x < μ. ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10: 
The utility of an individual with after tax income  x t from sorting is  x t E 0 t if 
 x ∈ [0,  x 1 ] and  x t E k t −  ∑ i=1 k x i t( E i t −  E i−1 t ) if  x ∈ [ x k ,  x k+1 ] for  k = 1, ..., n. 
Integrating over all types  x, we get:
(34)
  u(x) = F( x 1 ) ( E 0 t) 2 +  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
(F( x i+1 ) − F( x i )) ( E i t) 2 −  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
(1 − F( x i )) x i t( E i t −  E i−1 t )
 =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
F( x i ) ( ( E i−1 t ) 2 −  ( E i t) 2 ) +  ( E n−1 t ) 2 −  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
(1 − F( x i )) x i t( E i t −  E i−1 t )
 =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
F( x i ) ( E i−1 t  −   E i t) ( E i−1 t  +   E i t) +  ( E n−1 t ) 2 −  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
(1  −  F( x i )) x i t( E i t  −   E i−1 t )
 =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1( E i−1 t −  E i t) [F( x i ) ( E i−1 t +  E i t) + (1 − F( x i )) x i t] +  ( E n−1 t ) 2 
whereas the average utility from FR is:
(35)  μ (F( x 1 ) E 0 t +  ∑ i=1
n−1
(F( x i+1 ) − F( x i )) E i t) = μ ( ∑ i=1
n−1
F( x i )( E i−1 t −  E i t) +  E n−1 t ) .
The difference  Δ = u(x) − u(Fr) = 
(36)  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
( E i−1 t −  E i t) [F( x i ) ( E i−1 t +  E i t) + (1 − F( x i )) x i t] +  ( E n−1 t ) 2 
    − μ ( ∑ i=1
n−1
F( x i )( E i t −  E i+1 t ) +  E n−1 t ) 
  =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
( E i−1 t −  E i t) [F( x i )( E i−1 t +  E i t − μ) + (1 − F( x i )) x i t] +  E n−1 t ( E n−1 t − μ) .
Note that
(37)  E n−1 t  −  μ =  E n−1 t  −   ∑ 
i=1
n−1
F( x i ) ( E i−1 t −  E i t)  −   E n−1 t = − ∑ 
i=1
n−1
F( x i ) ( E i−1 t −  E i t) .
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Therefore:
(38)  Δ =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
 ( E i−1 t −  E i t) [F( x i )( E i−1 t +  E i t − μ) + (1 − F( x i )) x i t] 
 −  E n−1 t ∑ 
i=1
n−1
F( x i ) ( E i−1 t −  E i t) 
 =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
 ( E i−1 t −  E i t) [F( x i )( E i−1 t +  E i t −  E n−1 t − μ) + (1 − F( x i )) x i t] 
We now add and subtract  ∑ j=i+1 n−1 E j t in the summation, with the convention that if 
i + 1 > n − 1 these expressions are zero , 
(39)
  Δ =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
 ( E i−1 t −  E i t) [F( x i ) ( E i−1 t +  E i t −  E n−1 t 
 +  ∑ 
j=i+1
 
n−1
  E j t −  ∑ 
j=i+2
 
n−1
  E j t − μ) + (1 − F( x i )) x i t] 
  =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
 ( E i−1 t −  E i t) [F( x i ) ( E i−1 t +  ∑ j=i
n−2
( E j t −  E j+1 t ) − μ) + (1 − F( x i )) x i t] .
We now move the expressions  ( E j t −  E j+1 t )F( x i )( E i−1 t −  E i t) for any  i up to their 
relevant position,  j + 1, in the summation,
(40)  Δ =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
 ( E i−1 t −  E i t) 
 ×  [F( x 1 ) E 0 t +  ∑ j=1
i
 (F( x j+1 ) − F( x j )) E j t − F( x i )μ + (1 − F( x i )) x i t] .
Note that,  F( x 1 ) E 0 t +  ∑ j=1 i (F( x j+1 ) − F( x j )) E j t − F( x i )μ = (1 − F( x i ))(μ −  _ E i t) 
and so we have,
(41)  Δ =  ∑ 
i=1
n−1
 ( E i−1 t −  E i t) (1 − F( x i )) (μ +  x i t −  _ E i t) ,  
and the rest is shown in the main text.  ∎ 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 3: 
By the mean value theorem,
(42)  Φ (μ,  _ E x ) − Φ(μ, μ) < Φ ( x,  _ E x ) + Φ(x,  E _ x ) 
 ⇔   Φ 2 ( x,  y ′ ∈  ( E _ x ,  
_
 E x ) )   ________________ Φ 2 (μ,  y ″ ∈  (μ,  _ E x ) ) >  
 _ E x − μ _______  E x −  E _ x  = F(x) where
  Φ 2 ( x,  y ′ ∈  ( E _ x ,  _ E x ) ) ( _ E x −  E _ x ) = Φ ( x,  _ E x ) − Φ(x,  E _ x )
  Φ 2 (μ,  y ″ ∈  (μ,  _ E x ) ) ( _ E x − μ) = Φ (μ,  _ E x ) − Φ(μ, μ) .
We show that under the two conditions  
 Φ 2 (x,  y ′ ∈ ( E _ x ,  _ E x ))  ____________ Φ 2 (μ,  y ″ ∈ (μ,  _ E x )) ≥  
x _μ, or equivalently that:
(43)   Φ 2 ( x,  y ′ ∈  ( E _ x ,  
_
 E x ) )   ________________ x ≥   Φ 2 (μ,  y ″ ∈  (μ,  
_
 E x ) )   ________________μ .
Note however that
(44)   Φ 2 (x,  y ′ ∈ ( E _ x ,  
_
 E x )) _______________x ≥   Φ 2 (μ,  y ′ ∈ ( E _ x ,  
_
 E x ))_______________  μ ≥   Φ 2 (μ,  y ″ ∈ (μ,  
_
 E x )) _______________μ ,
where concavity in second element will imply the second inequality, and for the 
first inequality, a sufficient condition is that  
 Φ 2 ( x,  y ′ ∈  ( E _ x ,  _ E x ) )   _____________x is decreasing in  x , 
i.e., if  
 Φ 2 (x, y) ______ Φ 12 (x, y) ≥ x. ∎ 
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